Risk Rating System of X.509 Certificates  by Hawanna, Varsharani et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  89 ( 2016 )  152 – 161 
1877-0509 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of organizing committee of the Organizing Committee of IMCIP-2016
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2016.06.027 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Twelfth International Multi-Conference on Information Processing-2016 (IMCIP-2016)
Risk Rating System of X.509 Certiﬁcates
Varsharani Hawannaa,∗, V. Y. Kulkarnia, R. A. Ranea, P. Mestrib and S. Panchalb
aMAEER’s MIT, Pune 411 038, India
bIBM Security, IBM, Pune 411 057, India
Abstract
X.509 certiﬁcates enable to afﬁrm the distinguishing proof of the parties involved in the communication. As of now, majority of
individuals and communities are using X.509 certiﬁcates to demonstrate their ID during on-line exchanges, so the unwavering
quality and risk level of these certiﬁcates come into a question. Hence, we have proposed a framework which assesses risk associated
with X.509 Certiﬁcates with the help of certain trust criteria and characteristics. For evaluating risk related with certiﬁcate we use
classiﬁcation Technique with machine learning algorithm, which categorizes risk of certiﬁcate in three levels-High Risk, Medium
Risk and Low risk. Our system is useful to ﬁnd out risk associated with certiﬁcate while user carries out important transactions.
User needs to input the certiﬁcate and system will provide risk associated with that certiﬁcate and if it is a high risk or medium risk
certiﬁcate it will mention due to which parameter it bears risk. Our framework has application in browser-server communication
and detecting phishing websites which have Https URLs.
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1. Introduction
X.509 certiﬁcate10 or public key certiﬁcate is a digitally signed statement that binds the value of a public key to the
identity of the individual, gadget, or service that holds the respective private key. One of the principle advantages of
certiﬁcates is that, it no longer needs to keep up an arrangement of passwords for individual subjects which should be
veriﬁed as a necessary step to get to, rather, the host only sets up trust in a certiﬁcate issuer.
Certiﬁcates can be utilized for:
1. Veriﬁcation, which conﬁrms the identity of an individual or thing.
2. Protection, which guarantees that data is just accessible to the target group.
3. Encryption.
4. Digital signatures.
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These are required for the security of your correspondences. Likewise, numerous applications use certiﬁcates, for
example, email applications and Web programs. Our system has application in Web programs.
In X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Certiﬁcate Authority (CA) issue a certiﬁcate, this certiﬁcate is used as
recognizable proof of its subject. CA is a trusted outsider between two correspondence parties, which plays the role
of issuing certiﬁcate by afﬁrming both the parties incorporated into the communication. Generally, the CA issues a
certiﬁcate to the subject in light of its own rule archives. For example, the Certiﬁcate Policy (CP) and Certiﬁcation
Practice Statement (CPS). The CP deﬁnes a set of standards that the CA keeps up during the life cycle of a certiﬁcate10.
This is one of the essential documents to quantify the trust level of a certiﬁcate.
As of now, there is a well-known approach for managing trust in CAs that comprises a list of trusted CAs in web
browsers. This list of root CAs differs from application to application and from OS to OS. Browsers conﬁrm the trust
of leaf certiﬁcate in light of its CA, but consider the possibility that CA in the trust store no longer be trusted. Recently,
Google introduced an article-“Google calls out certiﬁcate authorities that can no longer be trusted”9. Article discusses
about Google’s Submariner which ﬁlls the gaps of listing certiﬁcate authorities that were once trusted, by withdrawing
it from Google’s root program and including new certiﬁcate authorities that are in the pipeline but have not yet been
added to the trusted list of root store. So in our framework we considered just single certiﬁcate different checks, it is
not fully dependent on its CA. Refer section 8 for points of interest.
Currently, there is no automated mechanism for ﬁnding the risk level of a certiﬁcate. In this paper, we have
contributed in proposing such a framework which will automatically evaluate risk associated with certiﬁcate, where
user needs to input the certiﬁcate. We are using Random Forest machine learning algorithm due to its accuracy and
efﬁciency feature. We ﬁrst collect both trusted and untrusted certiﬁcates. Then extracting certiﬁcates various ﬁelds and
storing them into CSV ﬁle, which becomes dataset of our system. Now, apply the classiﬁer or algorithm and get result
in three categories of Risk. Here machine learning algorithm will be very useful in following scenario: Gradually with
time, if value of some attributes for risk criteria changes, just make changes in dataset, our model will automatically
learn and give appropriate results.
Overall paper is organized in nine sections. Section 1 gives a brief Introduction of x.509 certiﬁcates and problem
statement. Section 2 describes about background theory which emphasizes on some primary fundamentals of x.509
certiﬁcate. Section 3 explain what is the motivation for us to propose this problem statement. Section 4 gives Extensive
Literature Survey of previous work. In Section 5, the Problem deﬁnition of the project is discussed. Section6 gives
description of system. Section 7 showsmathematicalmodel for proposed approach. Section 8 gives the implementation
details of modules. Section9 discusses the conclusion and future works.
2. Background Theory
X.509 was ﬁrst issued in 1988 and was started in association with the X.500 standard. It strictly follows structural
system of certiﬁcate authorities (CA) for issuing the certiﬁcates. The X.500 framework has ever been implemented by
sovereign countries for state identity information sharing settlement satisfaction purposes, and the IETF’s Public-Key
Infrastructure (X.509), or PKIX, Experts have adapted the standard to the more efﬁcient association of the Internet.
Actually, the term X.509 certiﬁcate more often refers to the IETF’s PKIX Certiﬁcate and CRL Proﬁle of the X.509 v3
certiﬁcate standard, as determined in RFC 528010, usually alluded to as PKIX for Public Key Infrastructure (X.509).
In the following subsections we will see standard format of X.509 all versions certiﬁcate, its sample certiﬁcate, and
ﬁle format or extensions of X.509 certiﬁcate. Further from this point, in this paper we will use the term certiﬁcate
which refers to X.509 certiﬁcate
2.1 Standard format of X.509 certiﬁcate
Following ﬁgure demonstrates the standard format of all forms of x.509 certiﬁcate. Version1 incorporates essential
ﬁelds, Version 2 incorporates all ﬁelds of version 1 and in addition to it issuer unique identiﬁer and subject unique
identiﬁer ﬁelds, yet it is not generally utilized as a part of the protected exchanges on Internet. Therefore, version 3
accompanies additional extension ﬁelds.
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Fig. 1. Standard Format of x.509 Certiﬁcate.
Certiﬁcate ﬁeld description:
Version: 1, 2, 3 are the three versions of X.509 certiﬁcate structure. V3 certiﬁcates have wide utilization.
Serial Number: It is a unique number assigned by CA to the subject.
Signature Algorithm: Used by the CA to sign the certiﬁcate. It can be RSA + MD5, RSA, MD5.
Issuer Name: This ﬁeld indicates information with respect to the CA that issues certiﬁcate.
Validity Period: It determines begin and end date of the certiﬁcate. Certiﬁcate must be in its legitimacy period.
Subject Name: speciﬁes the name of individual, PC, gadget, or CA to whom certiﬁcate is issued.
Subject Public Key Info: speciﬁes about public key type and length associated with the certiﬁcate.
Subject/Issuer Unique Identiﬁer (v2only): It is an optional ﬁeld. It provides a location to specify a bit string to uniquely
identify the subject/issuer name, in the event that the same name has been assigned to more than one subject/CA over
the time.
Extensions: This ﬁeld is present in x.509 v3. Fields in extensions are not same in all the certiﬁcates of version 3. If they
are available, will be shown. For additional extension ﬁelds refer5.
2.2 Sample X.509 certiﬁcate
We are demonstrating ICICI bank certiﬁcate which is issued by VeriSign Certiﬁcation Authority. Double tap this
certiﬁcate to view its properties and details. This data is shown on three tabs: General, Details, and Certiﬁcation Path.
First we will see general tab, it contains certiﬁcate information about purpose for which the certiﬁcate is intended,
issuer to, issued by, validity period as shown in Fig. 2(a). One can Install certiﬁcate, convert it in base 64 format and
save in their computer.
Detail tab contains information as shown in ﬁgure Fig. 2(b). In Detailed Tab when one clicks on copy to ﬁle, it
will lead to Certiﬁcate Export Wizard. It will help to copy ﬁle in your computer, in Der, Pem (base64), .PKCS#7,
.PKCS#12 ﬁle formats. Der and pem format have .cer as extension, PKCS#7 and .PKCS#12 have .p7b and .pfx
extension respectively. Certiﬁcation Path tab, shows hierarchy of leaf certiﬁcate.
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Fig. 2. (a) General Tab of Certiﬁcate; (b) Detail Tab of Certiﬁcate.
Fig. 3. (a) Previous Scenario of x.509 Certiﬁcate Trust Model; (b) Current Scenario of x.509 Certiﬁcate Trust Model.
3. Motivation
TheX.509 trust model has three primary substances: certiﬁcation authority (CA), certiﬁcate holder (CH) and relying
party (RP). The certiﬁcation authority is a trusted outsider between the certiﬁcate holder and relying party. CAs primary
role is to issue a certiﬁcate by conﬁrming both the inputs included in the communication. If the certiﬁcate holder
needs to correspond with RP, CH should give the afﬁrmation of identity, so certiﬁcate holder request for a certiﬁcate
to CA. CA issues a certiﬁcate to certiﬁcate holder by verifying certiﬁcate holder information and by analyzing various
guideline documents such as the Certiﬁcate Policy (CP) and Certiﬁcation Practice Statement (CPS).
Anyway, this methodology would be effective if there is only CA present or if RPs had a previous association with
the CA,as shown in Fig. 3(a). But currently, circumstance is altogether different from previous one. Nowadays, there
are many CA established so RPs have no connection with any CAs at all, as appeared in Fig. 3(b).
Subsequently, RPs need to fabricate their trust choice by performing a few checks: the signature on the certiﬁcate
must be conﬁrmed, path from the certiﬁcate to a trusted root certiﬁcate must be found and assessed, and the extension
ﬁelds must be checked, so on. Another most essential thing that RP needs to analyze is a set of documents like
Certiﬁcate Policy (CP), Certiﬁcation Practice Statement (CPS). These are the critical steps to verify the trust level of
certiﬁcate or discovering risk level connected with it.
To help RP, we propose a framework which automates all tasks, discovers the risk level of certiﬁcates and passes
onto RP. In our system user is the RP, server is the CH when certiﬁcate is new or unknown to the browser. System
plays intermediate role between RP and CH.
4. Literature Survey
There are many authors who propose their work to help RP in evaluating the trust of certiﬁcate.
Wazan A.S. propose an explicit master recommender15 whose action is to give the fundamental data permitting RPs
to settle on an informed choice around a CA. Now, the RP comprehends whether to accept a certiﬁcate or not for
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Table 1. Literature Survey Table.
SN Paper Title Publication Features Gap Identiﬁcation References
1 The X.509 trust model needs a
technical and legal
expert.(2012)
IEEE Solution used in both situations
when RP knows CA and when
RP don’t know about CA.
Find trustworthiness of
certiﬁcate based on its CA.
15
2 A formal model of trust for
calculating the quality of
X.509 certiﬁcate.(2011)
IEEE While accepting certiﬁcate
users can specify risk they
want to take.
To ﬁnd out trust of certiﬁcate
System requires more
Calculation.
13,16
.
3 A Model for Automatically
Evaluating Trust in X.509
Certiﬁcates.(2010)
Cybernetica Provide a ternary
recommendation regarding
certiﬁcates trustworthiness, not
binary.
Users can manually add any
known or obscure certiﬁcates
to the data store and utilizes
this for discovering trust.
1
.
a speciﬁc transaction. The master recommender ought to be autonomous of PKIs and must assume both the part of
technical and legal expert for helping the RPs. By including explicitly this role to X.509 trust model, the assignment
of RPs is streamlined, and RPs has to depend just on the master and not on every single CA of certiﬁcate holders.
In paper13,16, wazan, labored, barrere and benzekri proposed a structure which gives RPs qualitative data to decide
the Quality of Certiﬁcate (noted QoCER). This quality is ascertained in light of two parameters: QoCPS and QoPKI.
Relation between QoCER, QoPKI and QoCPS as following: QoCER = ϕ(QoPKI) X QoCPS; where function ϕ can
be any function that outputs a value between 0 and 1, QoPKIlies between 0 and 1, QoCPS lies between 0 and 1.
Authors propose a procedure of acceptance which incorporates the idea of QoCER. First, structure performs basic
search for the certiﬁcate of root authority. In the event that this certiﬁcate has a place with the static trust domain,
the RP accepts the certiﬁcate. The static trust area contains completely known and controlled CAs. This allows
improving the performance of the acceptance procedure when managing with well-known partners. Otherwise, the RP
processes the QoCER that comprises of: a) Getting the QoCPS from an authority which is recognized to perform this
assignment; b) Getting the QoPKI of the CAs that assigns this certiﬁcate from an authority recognized to perform this
task; c) Calculating the QoCER as per the speciﬁc function ϕ; This quality speaks to a quantitative evaluation of the
authenticity and trustworthiness of the certiﬁcate.
In paper1 Ahmed and Bogdanov’s Framework executes as follows: Initially, the customer application keeps up a
data store of trusted and untrusted certiﬁcates. when a customer application needs to assess a certiﬁcate, it 1st checks in
its own data store. If the certiﬁcate is in the trusted zone, it is acknowledged, otherwise, rejected. Clients can manually
add obscure certiﬁcates to the data store. However, if the certiﬁcates status can’t be assessed from the data store,
framework performs extra conﬁrmation steps to consequently assess the trust level of a certiﬁcate. 2nd the framework
can check if the key utilization ﬁeld matches with the usage requirements of the customer application. If yes, then
proceed with the assessment. Otherwise, the certiﬁcates ought to be rejected. 3rd, it checks amount of data accessible
in the certiﬁcate’s distinguished name (DN) ﬁeld. Certiﬁcates with less attribute data get a lower rating. In the 4th step,
the application checks the accessibility of the CPS link ﬁeld. A certiﬁcate without a CPS link is considered as a low
trustworthy. In the 5th step, the application can utilize the semi-formalization technique on the CPS to assess the trust
level of a CA. A rating is given in light of all the above 5 steps assessment and threshold values.
We identiﬁed some features and gap identiﬁcations of above papers and showing this in tabular format of Table 1.
There are some authors who used classiﬁcation on certiﬁcate datasets for different purposes. So we did brief
literature survey of such papers and described as follows:
Mishari, present a novel strategy to recognize web-extortion by recognizing domains hosting such as malignant
exercises11. Authors collect certiﬁcates of authentic domain from Alexa site, popular domains from the .com/.net
Internet Zone File and those utilized by deceptive from different domains of phishing URLs. Authors examined these
collected certiﬁcates and think of components which uncover contrasts between certiﬁcates used by deceptive and
authentic/popular domains. Authors use classiﬁcation technique for IdentifyingWeb-Fraud. We studied these features
and utilize some of them for our risk analysis.
Zheng Dong6 proposed a machine-learning way to deal with distinguished phishing sites utilizing features from
X.509 public key certiﬁcates. It utilizes Planet Lab for certiﬁcate gathering from three landmasses. Authors framework,
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ﬁrst download certiﬁcate from given site, once it is downloaded, it is parsed locally into a set of values as indicated
by the standard X.509 certiﬁcate ﬁelds. The 42 elements are then computed from the mandatory and optional ﬁelds.
The instances are then spared in an ARFF format and send it for further classiﬁcation. We get some thought by
concentrating on various features which is gathered by parsing X.509 certiﬁcate ﬁelds.
5. Problem Deﬁnition
By doing brief literature survey and studying different features and ﬁnding out gap identiﬁcations of some initial
research, we build our problem deﬁnition. We isolate it in two phases as follows:
Phase I: Rate the risk level considering different traits and attributes of certiﬁcate using classiﬁcation techniques.
Phase II: Our framework has an application in browser and server communication during SSL handshake. We will
implement this framework system as a plug in for browser, hence when certiﬁcate is unknown/new to browser our
system will track it, ﬁnd out risk and ﬁnally display risk associated with certiﬁcate on screen so user can decide
whether to continue a transaction or not, by considering risk factor.
6. Proposed System
As depicted in section 5, our framework has two stages. In stage I, we execute our framework as stand alone
software, so user can enter certiﬁcate and ﬁnd out risk associated with it. After completing Stage I, we will write a
plug-in for browser. We divide our framework in three modules.
• Module 1 involves collection of trusted and untrusted x.509 certiﬁcate and store in trust store.
• Module 2 involves collection of trust attribute/criteria.
• Module 3 deals with implementation of classiﬁcation.
In this paper we portray our work with respect to stage I. As depicted in Fig. 4, any user inputs the desirable certiﬁcate
to ﬁnd out the risk associated with it. Our classiﬁcation module applies certain trust criteria; according to matching
attributes it calculates result in % matching and classiﬁes risk in three levels – high, low, medium risk. We set a
Medium risk (MR)−threshold and Low risk (LR)−threshold according to trust attribute/criteria weight or impact. The
system compares results with LR & MR−threshold and classify accordingly as shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Flow of Proposed Framework.
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Fig. 5. System Architecture with Classiﬁcation Module.
Our system ﬁrst gathers trusted and untrusted certiﬁcates and store in trust store, as shown in Fig. 5. (See section 8).
Each certiﬁcate contains attributes as appeared in section 2.1 sample certiﬁcates detail tab. Then we extract only those
attributes which are considered in the trust assessment process, (see list of attributes in section 5). We extract these
features (attributes), using java libraries like java.security.cert.X509Certiﬁcate.
As described above version 3 certiﬁcates contain extension ﬁelds; however, these ﬁelds are not same for each
version 3 certiﬁcates so we require preprocessing on the extracted feature. In preprocessing we ﬁll missing values of
extension ﬁelds and get processed data in the format which will require for the classiﬁcation.
We have chosen to utilize R programming as a classiﬁer device due to its usability, built in packages and Random
forest (RF) as an ensemble classiﬁer due to its effectiveness and more accuracy features. Another reason to use RF is
that it has a feature to ﬁnd out most important attributes.
7. Mathematical Model
Following is the mathematical model of certiﬁcate Risk Rating System (CRRS):
CRRS = {I, F, O}; where, I = Input set; F = system function; O = output set.
I = {Cu1,Cu2,Cu3 . . .Cun}; where, Cu1,Cu2,Cu3 . . .Cun are the n no of certiﬁcates.
O = {HR, MR , LR}; where, HR = High Risky; MR = Medium Risky; LR = Low Risky.
F = {FDC, FFE , FDSS, FC }; where, FDC = Data Collection; FFE = Field Extraction; FDSC = Data
SetCreation; FC = Classiﬁcation.
Now, we will see each function in detail.
1) FDC = {Ws , Nmt }; where, Ws = Wireshark tool; Nmt = Network Miner tool. Now, Ws = {WPL}; where,
WPL = Winpcaplibrary. WPL = {pcap−lookupdev(), pcap−setﬁlter(), pcap−lookupnet(), pcap−sendpacket()};
where, pcap−lookupdev() = to extract the list of all the adapters; pcap−setﬁlter() = apply a ﬁlter;
pcap−lookupnet()which retrieves IP address and mask of a speciﬁed network adapter; pcap−sendpacket() = The
function used for sending packets.
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Fig. 6. Wireshark Captured Sample PCAP ﬁle.
2) FFE = Field Extraction {JF }; where JF = Java Function; JF = {H } where, H = Hashing {hashCode()} Hash
code h(s) deﬁned by h(s) = ∑n−1i=0 s[i ] · 31n−1−i where, terms are summed using Java 32-bit integer addition,
s[i ] denotes the i th character of the string, and n is the length of S.
3) FDSC = {FFE , DSCSV }; where, FFE = Feature Extracted from above module; DSCSV = Data set in CSV
format; by using Java FFE are inserted into CSV ﬁle.
4) FC = {DSCSV , RFC , RP }; where, RFC = Random Forest Classiﬁer; RP = R Programming. Apply RFC on
DSCSV using RP as a classiﬁer tool.
8. Implementation Details
Module 1: Data collection:
For the collection of trusted certiﬁcates, we use Alexa2 https domains. Alexa is a standard website relevant for its
Internet websites positioning according to most well-known or most utilized sites as a part of the world. It also provides
a facility of narrowing the search by country, by category like news, games, etc. From these we tried top 900 ranked
websites sorted by nation India. As a result, we were able to gather near about 1902–2100 certiﬁcates using wire
shark12 and network miner8 tool, out of which we found nearly 2000 certiﬁcates unique.
Initially, we go on alexa site, copy a legitimate URL with a constraint that it should be https and paste in browser.
In background we run wire shark, when https sites exchange certiﬁcates during SSL handshake, it captures trafﬁc of
these domains on port 443 which is standard port of https protocol, with “ ssl.handshake.certiﬁcate” as a ﬁlter.
It generates a PCAP ﬁle, which comprises of number of packets and each packet with this ﬁlter contains ﬁve frames-
Frame, Ethernet, Internet Protocol, Transmission Control Protocol, secure socket layer. From these frames certiﬁcate
is stored in secure socket layer frame, as shown in Fig. 6.
Then we feed this PCAP ﬁle as an input to the network miner as shown in Fig. 7, which extracts certiﬁcate from
packet and stores in different folders. We collect these certiﬁcates from all folder and store in data store; we call this
as trust store.
Now, for the collection of untrusted certiﬁcates we utilize phishing URL from phishtank.com site, it contains
rundown of phishing URLs. By applying past strategy, currently we get almost 1200 certiﬁcates out of which 900 are
unique. For both trusted and untrusted certiﬁcates our capturing is still in further progress.
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Fig. 7. Network Miners Extracted Certiﬁcates.
Module 2: Attributes and criteria used for ﬁnding the risk.
Assumption: risk and trust are opposite ﬁelds, if trust is 1 out of 10 then risk will be 9 out of 10.
• End date > current date: when user inputs the certiﬁcate, we compare its end date and current date. End date
of certiﬁcate should be greater than current date. We perform comparison by converting date into no of days.
If certiﬁcate gets expired i.e. end date is less than the current date, we label this certiﬁcate as high risk.
• Serial No and CRL: Certiﬁcate Revocation List (CRL)10 is a list of serial nos., that have been revoked by
certiﬁcation authority for following reasons-Superseded, Cessation of Operation, Afﬁliation changed. We ﬁrst
download this CRL, which will be available as CRL Distribution Point ﬁeld. By extracting CRL Distribution
Point ﬁeld which gives value as URL from where we can download the CRL list. Then extract serial no. from
certiﬁcate and check whether this serial no. is listed in CRL, if it is found in CRL list it will be directly treated as
high risk certiﬁcate. If not found in CRL list it will support trust criteria.
• Domain name and subject name should be the same, this leads to positive effect in trustworthiness (low risk)3.
• CPS link: Certiﬁcate Practice Statement (CPS)7 is an archive from a certiﬁcate authority which portrays their
practice for issuing and managing certiﬁcates. Presence of CPS link in its extension ﬁeld, leads to positive
contribution in less risk (trustworthiness).
• CPS document: Clicking on cps link redirects to a webpage, in this webpage ﬁrst link contain a CPS document.
This documents size is different for different CA. Presence of cps document on link will be treated as positive
contribution in trust (low risk).
• CPS weight: we parse the cps document and verify all the 27 attributes described by authorsOmar Batarﬁ, Lindsay
Marshall in paper4. We rate according to matching attributes and treat this as one parameter in our calculation.
We decide to build our own algorithm to parse the CPS document using natural language processing.
• Chain validation: For each CA certiﬁcate we validate the trust. We perform following sub-checks for chain
validation:
1. CA should have more validity than its leaf certiﬁcate.
2. Issuer name of leaf certiﬁcate should be same as subject name of CA.
3. If it is a CA certiﬁcate, CA bit must be 1.
4. If CA certiﬁcate has path length = 0 it can issue only leaf certiﬁcate. Refer3.
• Large key size, leads to contribution in more trust. Here, we are considering key size with respect to its public
key algorithm.
• Signature algorithm should be strong. Only MD5 leads to positive contribution towards high risk11.
• Certiﬁcate should be in its valid period. Not more than decade, not less than a year11
• Subject and issuer name shouldn’t be some state, some organization. It should have valid names. If these ﬁelds
contain invalid names or valid names but less information, it leads to positive contribution towards high risk3.
Hence we are validating 12 ﬁelds and 31 sub-ﬁelds i.e. total 43 attributes or criteria of a single certiﬁcate for rating the
risk.
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9. Conclusions and Future Work
Our system is undertaken to ﬁnd out risk level of x.509 certiﬁcate as high risk, medium risk and low risk form.
For this we are using classiﬁcation with performing certain checks and trust criteria. For classiﬁcation we decided to
use Random Forest algorithm and R programming tool. As an application, we will write our system as a plug-in for
browser so, it will help user for knowing risk associated with certiﬁcate for further transaction, when certiﬁcate is
not known or new for browser. In this paper, we described about how we collect the certiﬁcates and list many trust
criteria/attributes which we are considering during risk level calculation.
In future we will extend our system by adding different features of legitimate website for detecting real-time
phishing attacks both Http and Https based.
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